Toward Definition

The following is a segment from the Dialogues of Plato¹:

Socrates: “What I asked you, my friend, was, What is piety? and you have not explained to me, to my satisfaction. You only tell me that what you are doing now, namely, prosecuting your father for murder, is a pious act.”

After some cajoling from Socrates, Euthyphro offers this definition:

“What is pleasing to the gods is pious, and what is not pleas­ing to them is impious.”

Socrates effectively shows Euthyphro—in fact he gets a “con­fession” from him—that gods may differ among themselves, may even quarrel, with some gods accepting certain acts as pious and others coming hard on the same act as impious. So bringing “gods” into the definition does not help in defining piety. The dialog continues,

Socrates: “[P]iety and impiety cannot be defined in that way; for we have seen that what is displeasing to the gods is also pleas­ing to them. So I will let you off in this point Euthyphro; and all the gods shall agree in thinking your father’s deed wrong and in hating it, if you like. But shall we correct our definition and say that whatever all the gods hate is impious and whatever they all love is pious: while whatever some of them love and others hate, is either both or neither? Do you wish us now to define piety or impiety in this manner?”

Euthyphro: “Why not Socrates?”

Socrates: “There is no reason why I should not Euthyphro. It is for you to consider whether that definition will help you to teach me what you promised.”

Euthyphro: “Well I should say that piety is what “all the gods love and that impiety is what they all hate.” [emphasis mine]

The dialog, of course, goes further. There are two points wor­thy of note. Firstly, Socrates insists on defining a quality, piety, so that in any further discussion, he and Euthyphro shall have a common ground. And secondly, he is, in fact, defining what a definition should be. If some gods agree that a certain act is pious, and some other gods disagree, holding the opinion that the same act is impious, then the word “piety,” based on that act, is not defined satisfactorily. If, instead, all the gods agree that a certain act is pious, then that act serves the purpose of being an example, and the word “piety” can be attached to it. So, a definition should be such that it helps avoid disputes or disagreements. In the situ­ation quoted, it is the dispute, the disagreements among gods, that is evidenced. In our context, in place of gods for the ancient Greeks, we find other researchers, each of whom is a self-appointed judge and the harbinger of truth in his little corner of the world. And to make the situation worse, these earthly gods are usually scattered over wide stretches of space and time. Any word or combination of words, including symbols, that a researcher employs in his discourse, needs to be clear beyond the possibility of being mistaken by any other researchers in his field; that is how definitions become relevant.

Definition is the domain of logicians and philosophers. But it is necessary that the experimental researcher should have some familiarity to build on, in case he needs either to use definitions in his own work or to understand definitions in the works of oth­ers. To that extent, we will review, in brief outline, some impor­tant aspects of definitions. In addition, this chapter aims to impress upon the experimental researcher that the process of defining, when required, should not be done casually.

Source: Srinagesh K (2005), The Principles of Experimental Research, Butterworth-Heinemann; 1st edition.