How phenomenology can help us learn from the experiences of others

What is phenomenology? In simple terms, phenomenology can be defined as an approach to research that seeks to describe the essence of a phenomenon by exploring it from the perspective of those who have experienced it [6]. The goal of phenomenology is to describe the meaning of this experience—both in terms of what was experienced and how it was

Perceptual Properties: Sensory Effects and the Representational Structure of Perception

According to von Helmholtz ([1867] 1925, ill: 2off.), every property of natural things is an effect that is brought about by the interaction of physical objects or bodies, given their mutual relations due to the forces that objects exert on one another. He considers mechanical, chemical, optical, electrical, and magnetic properties as descriptions of

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Sensory Aggregates and the Projection of Knowledge

Von Helmholtz holds that every perceptual experience consists in the above- mentioned components, but the proportion in which these components occur may vary. For example, in a brightly sunlit room perception is characterized by vivid visual sensations, hence it has no element whatsoever that does not derive from an actual direct sensation. In the

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Normal Conditions and Experimental Observation

Von Helmholtz’s theory has an inferential and constructivist nature, but it does not overlook the function of the phenomenal component of perception. As Hatfield (2002) remarks, the minor premises are the sensory aggregates, and the inductive conclusions result in the appearances of things. However, the appearances are determined more by the epistemic interpretation of

Perceptual Properties at Face Value: The Phenomenal Basis of Science

When Hering outlined his view of the nature and science of perception, he made alternative claims to von Helmholtz’s theory on the epistemology of perceptual reference, the theoretical decomposition of perception and the associated methodological issues. For example, Hering considers it an un­questionably observable fact that naive subjects ascribe colors to things as independent

Appearances, Meaning and Relations

The problem of lightness and color constancy is a clear example of this fun­damental divergence. Hering’s account gives a different solution from von Helmholtz’s. It also vindicates the tenet that the terms, the concepts and the primitives of the theory have to fit the meaning of appearances, in the sense that their empirical specification

Observing Phenomena “from the Outside”: Series and Order of Appearances

Hering’s demand that the terms, the concepts and the primitives of theory have to fit the characteristics of appearances also has great methodological impor­tance. Von Helmholtz’s theory is charged with bringing in unnecessary mental constructs because of insufficient description. The phenomenal component of perception is reduced to the sensory effects that are considered something

The Empirical Grammar of Perception in Brentano

Brentano’s phenomenological claims on perception can be found in the the­ory of perceptual reference as well as in the philosophical, that is, descriptive psychology (1874, 1982). Brentano contends that denoting something makes sense only if it implies an intentional reference by a subject to whom some­thing appears. If generalized, this claim means that something

The Elements of Phenomena

Brentano (1982: 138-139) holds that in general the merely physiological expla­nations fail to account for the inherent articulation of perceptual phenom­ena. Regardless of the physiological level at which the correlates are identified, perception is treated as a simple state while the plurality of its constitutive elements and their connection is overlooked. However simple they

The Neutral Science of Appearances in Stumpf

Stumpf (1907) maintains that phenomenology is a “neutral science,” whose objects are different from those of natural and human sciences. As a paradigm of natural science, physics “deduces” its objects from expe­rience. Unlike the pre-modern view of science, this does not mean that the objects of physics are constructed directly from appearances of color,

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The Immanent Structural Laws of Appearances

Stumpf’s conclusion is that appearances are “objective,” that is, they are given outside of and before the subjects, and their properties do not arise by means of psychic functions but rather trigger and guide them. If psychic functions react to appearances, no perceptual change occurs that is not admitted among the variations allowed by

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Husserl and the Form of the Theories of Perception

Husserl considers phenomenology a kind of meta-theory of knowledge. He claims that a theory is not a bundle of sentences or observations. It is a rule- based connection of propositions obtained by inductive or deductive methods as well as a model of the domain of its objects (1900/1901). Philosophical or scientific theories have theoretical

Phenomenal Reality and Psychology of Perception in Metzger

Metzger (1941: 10, 25) recognizes Husserl’s phenomenological contribution to a science of perception that prevents common-sense assumptions as well as extraneous philosophical concepts and scientific findings from defining its primitives. If the latter were drawn from the known physical and physiological properties of stimulation, the research could be limited solely to those features that

Koffka on the Phenomenological Questions of Perception Science

Koffka (1955) claims that the psychological theory of perception has to address the question “why do things look as they do?” This question epitomizes the phenomenological commitment of experimental research. Koffka maintains that a valid theory of perception should answer this question to be true to perceptual experience, and is thus committed to finding

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Experience, Science and Philosophy in Kohler

Kohler’s arguments on the epistemology of perception and the scientific method show that the philosophical tenets of phenomenology have experi­mental implications. Kohler (1944) claims that phenomenology provides the foundation of philosophy and science because it demands that a construct is admitted if justified by a valid description of phenomena. Of course, the ex­planation of

Meinong on Color Manifold

Meinong (1903) makes an analysis of the abstract structure of colors, which satisfies a general tenet on the study of experience derived from Brentano. He contends that the theory of experience is the analysis of the elements and the connections that are manifested in it. Meinong (1888: 134) holds that the phenomenal elements of

The Phenomenal Array of Experience: Boundaries and Continua in Brentano

Brentano (1976) formulates the theory of boundaries and qualitative continua for a deeper analysis of the nature of the spatial element that is a constitu­tive part of appearances (1982: 104-115). The primary object of perception is composed of the local determination of the place in the visual field where it occurs and of the

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Meaning in the Perceptual Field: Figure-Ground and Contour in Rubin

In his work on the figure-ground structure, Rubin (1921) addresses similar questions to Brentano’s theory of boundaries and qualitative continua. Ru­bin was acquainted with the theories of the Brentano School and quotes the work of Meinong, Benussi and Husserl, together with Schumann (1900) and and Schapp (1910). This section emphasizes the extent to which

Katz: The Phenomenological Method and Color and Touch Modes of Appearances

Katz recognized the importance of Husserl’s philosophical phenomenology and the application of its method to his research (Spiegelberg, 1972: 43). It is true that he acknowledges that Hering had already argued the need for a phe­nomenological analysis of color and attributes to Husserl an important role in clarifying the implications of the phenomenological method,

Wertheimer: The Perception of Movement and the “Natural” Organization

The work of Wertheimer (1912a and 1923) is correctly considered to lay bare the experimental foundations of Gestalt psychology. However, it is interesting to note the phenomenological tenets of his research that are to some extent independent of the Berlin School of Gestalt theory. It is well known that the first article deals with